8/21/2036

Kaos Capital Demands Board Overhaul at Capricor Ahead of FDA Decision on DMD Therapy

BigGo Finance (08/21/36)

Capricor Therapeutics Inc. (CAPR) is facing an activist campaign from shareholder Kaos Capital, which is demanding immediate board changes, a cash-preservation plan, and the creation of an M&A committee just one day before the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is scheduled to act on the company's experimental Duchenne muscular dystrophy therapy. Kaos Capital, a Miami-based investment firm that describes itself as a "significant and growing shareholder," issued a letter to fellow shareholders on August 21 calling for a meeting with the board within 15 business days. The firm said it intends to nominate two independent directors and push for a board-led M&A and Strategic Alternatives Committee chaired by a shareholder-backed director. The activist campaign lands at a precarious moment for Capricor. The FDA's action date on deramiocel, the company's cell therapy for DMD-related cardiomyopathy, is August 22. In June, an FDA advisory panel voted 9-3 against the drug's use for that indication, casting significant doubt over its approval prospects. Capricor shares were down approximately 2% at the time of the letter's release. In the letter signed by CEO Adam Arviv, Kaos argued that Capricor has become overly dependent on a single regulatory outcome and must take immediate steps to preserve capital while exploring acquisitions, licensing deals, and partnerships that could broaden its pipeline. The company reported $237.9 million in cash, cash equivalents, and marketable securities as of June 30, down roughly $80.2 million from year-end 2025. First-half 2026 operating expenses totaled $79.7 million, including $23.5 million in general and administrative costs — approximately double the comparable 2025 figure, according to the letter. Kaos called for a formal Cash Preservation Plan that would include: a near-term freeze on nonessential spending; a zero-based review of G&A expenses; enhanced approval requirements for material commitments; and quarterly reporting on cost reductions, cash runway, and capital use. The firm also urged the board to retain independent legal advisers and commission a review of oversight, disclosure controls, contracting, compensation, and capital-allocation processes. Kaos cited "numerous legal matters and shareholder demands" disclosed in Capricor's public filings, including securities and derivative actions, a Section 220 books-and-records demand, a patent action, a distribution dispute, and employment-related claims. A further securities class action was filed against the company and certain officers in 2026. "This legal overhang carries cost, distraction, reputational risk, and governance consequences," the letter stated. Kaos emphasized it is not asking Capricor to abandon deramiocel, which it believes "may still have meaningful value for patients." Instead, the firm wants the company to use its cash and public-company platform to build a broader, multi-modality biotechnology enterprise. The proposed M&A committee should evaluate assets in inflammation, fibrosis, tissue repair, targeted delivery, and regenerative medicine, the letter said. Kaos specifically pointed to advanced small-molecule pharmacology targeting the NLRP3/inflammasome signaling pathway as one area of interest. "Conviction in a lead program is not a license for a Board to concentrate all of a public company's capital, risk, and future in a single regulatory outcome," Arviv wrote. The activist push comes as Capricor awaits the FDA's decision on deramiocel. The agency's action date is August 22, though the timeline has grown complicated. After the advisory committee's negative vote in June, Capricor said the FDA was willing to review an amendment containing 24-month Hope-3 data focused on upper-limb function. A new target date has not been formally announced. Roth Capital expects the FDA review could be extended by approximately three months to accommodate the additional data. Kaos said it is prepared to work constructively with the board but warned of escalation if its demands are not met. If the board does not confirm and convene the requested meeting within the specified timeframe, Kaos said it will begin seeking shareholder support to elect its two independent nominees, replace directors, and potentially pursue removal of senior management. "We do not take that step lightly, but continued inaction would leave shareholders no reasonable alternative," the letter read.

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10/22/2026

Nidec Poses New-Old Test for Japanese Buyouts

Reuters Breakingviews (10/22/26) Lockett, Hudson

Nidec (TYO: 6594), Japan’s $16 billion precision-motor maker, is facing a major accounting crisis that could lead to its delisting from the Tokyo Stock Exchange, potentially creating an opportunity for private-equity investors. New CEO Michio Kaida said the company is still seeking auditor PwC’s approval for delayed financial results after recognizing about ¥1.1 trillion ($7 billion) in write-downs, including roughly ¥480 billion linked to accounting irregularities. Nidec must resolve its financial reporting issues by October 28 to avoid a forced delisting, while its shares have fallen sharply. The crisis is reminiscent of Toshiba, which following a 2015 accounting scandal became a high-profile option for hedge funds and investors including Elliott Management and Third Point. Nidec has also attracted investor interest, with Oasis Management building an almost 8% stake. Buyout firms such as Bain and KKR (NYSE: KKR) have the financial resources and restructuring expertise to pursue a takeover, but several obstacles could complicate a deal. Japanese authorities may consider some of Nidec’s more than 350 subsidiaries strategically important, while foreign investors could face resistance because of the company’s importance to Japan’s export economy. The experience of Toshiba, which ultimately went to a domestic consortium after foreign bidders faced concerns about strategic ownership, illustrates the potential difficulties. A successful Nidec transaction could therefore become an important test of Japan’s evolving corporate-governance and M&A environment.

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10/14/2026

Oasis Boosts Nidec Stake, Says It’s Now Largest Shareholder

Bloomberg (10/14/26) French, Alice; Taniguchi, Takako

Oasis Management has increased its stake in Japanese motor manufacturer Nidec Corp. (TYO: 6594), with founder Seth Fischer announcing that the fund is now the company’s largest shareholder. The move strengthens Oasis’s campaign for Nidec to explore a sale or consider going private amid a widening accounting scandal. Oasis has urged the board to appoint financial advisers to solicit acquisition proposals, warning that the company faces potential delisting if it cannot obtain an unqualified auditor’s opinion. Nidec, the world’s largest precision motor manufacturer, has faced investigations into widespread accounting fraud and quality-control problems at several subsidiaries. For the financial year ended March 31, the company recorded more than ¥600 billion ($3.8 billion) in writedowns, while its auditor declined to approve its financial statements. The Tokyo Stock Exchange has placed Nidec under special alert. Oasis previously disclosed a 7.97% stake as of September 9, while founder Shigenobu Nagamori directly owns approximately 8.3%. Nagamori resigned as chairman emeritus earlier this year following revelations about past accounting issues. Oasis, which manages approximately $13.6 billion in disclosed Japanese equity investments, has also criticized Nidec’s corporate culture and board appointments, intensifying pressure for governance reforms and strategic action.

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10/14/2026

Palliser Capital Urges Samsung Electronics to Issue ADRs and Buy Back Preferred Stock

BigGo Finance (10/14/26)

UK-based Palliser Capital has urged South Korea's Samsung Electronics (KRX: 005930) and Hyundai Motor (KRX: 005380) to buy back and retire preferred shares that trade at steep discounts to their common stock. For Samsung Electronics specifically, the fund escalated pressure by proposing that the company issue American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) in the United States to raise capital for additional preferred share repurchases. James Smith, founder and Chief Investment Officer of Palliser Capital, publicly made these demands on the 13th (local time) at the Sohn Investment Conference in San Francisco. "The price discount on preferred shares remains an overlooked issue in terms of corporate governance and capital allocation," Smith said. "Addressing it would enhance shareholder value across all share classes and strengthen confidence in South Korea's capital market reforms." Palliser Capital holds both common and preferred shares in Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Motor. According to the firm, Samsung Electronics preferred shares trade at a 26% discount to common stock, while Hyundai Motor's three classes of preferred shares trade at approximately 48% below common. Preferred shares carry dividend priority but typically lack voting rights, preventing holders from participating in management decisions at shareholder meetings. While these rights differences and relatively low trading volumes are cited as discount factors, Palliser argues the discount is excessive given that economic rights are substantively equivalent to common stock apart from voting power. The fund estimates that more than 85 trillion won (approximately $63.6 billion) in value is locked up due to the structural undervaluation of South Korean preferred shares. The logic: buying back and retiring undervalued preferred shares reduces the float, boosting earnings per share (EPS) and improving capital efficiency. Palliser made three specific proposals to Samsung Electronics. First, prioritize remaining shareholder return capital this year toward preferred share buybacks. Second, explicitly state in the 2027–2029 shareholder return plan a target to reduce the preferred share discount to the 10% level previously referenced. Third, explore issuing ADRs in the United States at a premium and using the proceeds for additional preferred share buybacks and retirements. For Hyundai Motor, Palliser demanded that preferred shares be prioritized in any share buyback program and that the company's value-enhancement plan include specific discount-reduction targets. Since Samsung Electronics announced a shareholder return plan of up to 110 trillion won (approximately $82.3 billion), funds both domestic and international have increasingly demanded focused buybacks and retirements of preferred shares. The rationale: purchasing deeply discounted preferred shares allows more shares to be retired for the same amount of capital, maximizing shareholder return impact. In South Korea, Life Asset Management sent a shareholder letter to Samsung Electronics in September arguing for expanded preferred share buybacks and retirements. The firm cited restrictions on common share retirements due to the Samsung Electronics common stock stakes held by Samsung Life Insurance (KRX: 032830) and Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance (KRX: 000810). Samsung Electronics has maintained a cautious stance on preferred-share-focused buybacks and retirements, citing fairness to common shareholders. However, the company has precedent for allocating a portion of buyback capital to preferred shares to narrow the discount. In 2015, to reduce the then-22% preferred share discount, Samsung Electronics allocated 35% of an 11.3 trillion won (approximately $8.5 billion) buyback program to preferred shares. At the time, the company explained that "more shares can be retired for the same amount of money" and that the approach "benefits not only preferred shareholders but also common shareholders." At the heart of this demand is the structural undervaluation of South Korean preferred shares. Despite having economic rights—including dividends—that differ little from common stock apart from the absence of voting rights, preferred shares have long traded at far lower prices than common shares simply due to lower liquidity and lack of voting power. Palliser Capital's CIO Smith emphasized: "Resolving the preferred share issue can improve capital allocation efficiency and strengthen confidence in South Korea's capital market reforms. The boards of both companies should incorporate preferred share measures—including buybacks and discount-reduction targets—into their value-enhancement plans." Whether the funds' demands will be accepted remains uncertain. Both Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Motor acknowledge that preferred share buybacks and retirements would be positive for common shareholders as well, but they are mindful that capital allocation concentrated on a specific share class could raise fairness concerns with common shareholders. However, with Samsung Electronics having announced a large-scale shareholder return plan, analysts note that ignoring the preferred share discount issue has become increasingly difficult.

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10/14/2026

Gold Fields Mounts Charm Offensive to Woo Northern Star Investors

Financial Times (10/14/26) Thomas, Daniel; Filder, Nic

Gold Fields (NYSE: GFI) has embarked on a charm offensive in Australia to try to convince shareholders in rival gold miner Northern Star (ASX: NST) to back its A$39 billion ($27 billion) takeover bid. Mike Fraser, chief executive of the South African miner, has traveled to Perth, Sydney and Melbourne this week to meet investors and discuss the merits of its offer for Northern Star that was rejected last month. He said shareholders he met were open to a combination that would create the world’s second largest gold miner and worth about $56 billion. “There’s an opportunity to create a Western Australia powerhouse in gold production — that certainly resonates with everyone,” Fraser told the FT. Gold Fields had spoken to a number of shareholders that own a significant slice of Northern Star shares, as well as its own investors, as the South African company considered increasing the cash component of its offer. Fraser said Gold Fields has been courting the rival, which has been hit by a series of profit warnings, for a year but had struggled to convince management to engage. Northern Star has rejected the offer as undervaluing its growth potential. Elliott Management has taken a stake in Northern Star to agitate for change and has called on the gold miner to open talks with its suitor. Fraser said he had recently met Elliott regarding Northern Star. A person familiar with Elliot’s thinking said that it would look at any proposal on its merits and that it expected the Northern Star board to do the same. Suresh Vadnagra, a former Glencore (LON: GLEN) executive, took over as chief executive of Northern Star this month and is due to provide his first comments as leader of the gold producer next week when the company reports quarterly results. Michael Chaney, chair of Northern Star, told the FT that the board remained focused “on acting in the best interests of shareholders” and would engage with “parties on proposals that represent value above what we believe Northern Star can generate as a standalone company.” He added: “The Gold Fields proposal was not in that category.” “We see a lot of risk ahead for Northern Star as they execute their growth projects,” Fraser said of the company's growth pipeline, such as the Hemi development in the Pilbara area of Western Australia. Northern Star shares closed at A$24.91 on Wednesday — some distance below the A$27 implied value of the rejected offer. One person with direct knowledge of the situation said Gold Fields' “charm offensive” reflected Northern Star's reticence to consider a sale of the business despite pressure from Elliott. However, the public nature of the approach had made that difficult for its new executive team. “The game's up,” the person said, arguing that Northern Star would probably need to gauge interest from other bidders such as Agnico Eagle (NYSE: AEM), or break itself up in the coming months. Gold Fields has said it expects to generate $5 billion in synergies due to the proximity of the two companies' mines and mills in the Kalgoorlie region of Western Australia. That reduced the risk of an interloper bid, Fraser said. “It will be very hard for anyone else to recreate that value,” he said. Fraser did not set a timeline on the deal but described the process as “early days” despite its long pitch to get Northern Star to the negotiating table. “I don't think it's helpful for any of us to have this dragging along. Bringing this to some form of conclusion in the not-too-distant future makes sense,” he said.

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10/14/2026

Palliser Does Not Accept the Takeover Bid and Seeks Clarification From the Board

Il Sole 24 Ore (10/14/26) D'Ascenzo, Monica

Palliser Capital is not participating in Respighi’s takeover bid for Recordati and is seeking clarification on the board of directors’ opinion regarding the increase in the takeover bid from 51.29 to 53 euros per share. According to the fund, the statement that the board ‘welcomes’ the increase has been interpreted by many as ‘a green light from the independent directors, but it is not.’ “The press release of 7 October,” Palliser emphasizes, “does not state that the independent directors consider the offer to be fair.” Therefore, “it does not contain a new reasoned opinion or a recommendation to accept the offer, and reiterates that the decision rests with each shareholder.” Hence Palliser’s request to Respighi BidCo, CVC and the independent directors to “publicly clarify their position by 5.30 pm on October 16.” ‘In the absence of clarification,’ the statement continues, ‘Palliser – and, it is expected, other shareholders as well – will act on the assumption that the independent directors have not deemed the price of 53 euros to be fair and do not recommend acceptance.' Meanwhile, the number of acceptances of the offer has virtually come to a standstill. As part of the voluntary full takeover bid launched by Respighi BidCo (a vehicle of CVC and GBL) for Recordati’s ordinary shares, it appears that 208,386 acceptance requests were submitted on October 13. Consequently, the total number of acceptance requests now stands at 100,249,177, representing approximately 50.49% of the total securities covered by the offer, according to Consob announcements. The takeover bid began on August 31 and will end on October 23, 2026, as extended. Several analysts, however, have assessed the share price to be lower than the company’s true value. According to Akros, for example, “the revised offer is still not sufficient to adequately compensate minority shareholders for Recordati’s standalone value and its growth potential.” The analysts therefore confirm their “buy” recommendation and target price of 65 euros. “Although the higher bid increases the likelihood of the deal’s success,” they conclude, “we continue to regard the price as unattractive relative to the company’s fundamental valuation.” Equita also recommends a “buy” on the company’s shares with a target price of 69 euros. “Whilst the financial terms have improved,” Intermonte concludes, “the new price remains significantly below our target price of 71 euros and, in our view, does not fully reflect the medium- to long-term value creation potential linked to Isturisa and the agreement with Moderna.” Several analysts, however, have assessed the share price to be lower than the company’s true value. According to Akros, for example, “the revised offer is still not sufficient to adequately compensate minority shareholders for Recordati’s standalone value and its growth potential”. The analysts therefore confirm their “buy” recommendation and target price of 65 euros. “Although the higher bid increases the likelihood of the deal’s success,” they conclude, “we continue to regard the price as unattractive relative to the company’s fundamental valuation.” Equita also recommends a “buy” on the company's shares with a target price of 69 euros. “Whilst the financial terms have improved,” Intermonte concludes, “the new price remains significantly below our target price of 71 euros and, in our view, does not fully reflect the medium- to long-term value creation potential linked to Isturisa and the agreement with Moderna.” Palliser Capital is back on the offensive regarding the public takeover bid launched by Respighi BidCo, the acquisition vehicle linked to CVC and GBL, for Recordati. The fund, a shareholder in the pharmaceutical group, has written to the board of directors requesting a public clarification on the position of the independent directors regarding the revised price of 53 euros per share. The request must be answered by 5.30 pm on October 16, Italian time. At the heart of the dispute lies the interpretation of the press release issued by Recordati on 7 October, in which the board had welcomed the increase in the consideration. According to Palliser, the market may have interpreted that stance as an endorsement of the offer by the independent directors, without there being sufficient formal grounds to support this. “Recordati’s press release of 7 October, in which the Board of Directors ‘welcomes’ the increase, has been widely interpreted as an endorsement by the independent directors. This is not the case,” the fund writes in the letter. The point, according to Palliser, is that the board’s expression of approval for the relaunch does not amount to a positive assessment of the fairness of the price, nor to a recommendation to accept the offer. The dispute continues with regard to disclosure requirements. “It contains no statement to the effect that the independent directors consider the Offer to be fair, nor a reasoned opinion updated in accordance with Article 39-bis of the Issuers’ Regulations, nor a recommendation to accept the Offer” Palliser points out, highlighting the absence of an explicit position on the fairness of the offer and of a formal update to the valuation. The fund therefore reiterates the position expressed by the board itself, according to which the final decision rests with individual shareholders, but warns of the possible consequences of an ambiguous interpretation of the press release. ‘If the market has misinterpreted the position of the independent directors, it is proceeding on the basis of an unfounded assumption at precisely the most critical stage of the Offer,' the letter states. Palliser is calling for two parties to publicly clarify the situation. On the one hand, Respighi BidCo and CVC, which, according to the fund, could stand to benefit from any misunderstandings regarding the position of the independent directors; on the other hand, the directors themselves, who are being asked to clarify whether they have revised the assessment made on July 14, when the offer price was deemed inadequate. Specifically, the fund is urging Respighi BidCo and CVC to ‘confirm whether, to the best of their knowledge, the independent directors have concluded that the Offer is fair or have recommended its acceptance’. It asks the independent directors, on the other hand, to “confirm whether they have reviewed their conclusion of 14 July 2026, according to which the offer price was inadequate, and whether they now recommend accepting the Offer at a price of 53 euros.” The request comes at a particularly delicate stage of the transaction, with the fund seeking to secure an unequivocal position before the specified deadline. Palliser also sets out what course of action it will take in the absence of a response: “In the absence of such confirmation, Palliser – and, in its view, the other shareholders as well – will act on the assumption that the independent directors have not concluded that the price of 53 euros per share is fair and do not recommend the Offer,” states the fund. With regard to the offer price, Palliser considers the revised offer of 1.71 euros per share – representing a 3.3% increase – to be insufficient. The new offer price of €53 remains, in fact, less than one euro below the lower limit of the valuation range based on the discounted cash flow method (Discounted Cash Flow, DCF) set out by Rothschild in the fairness opinion prepared for the independent directors. The indicated range is between 52.01 and 61.25 euros per share. Palliser also points out that this valuation precedes the publication of the results for the first half of 2026, during which the Rare Diseases business – identified by the fund as the group’s fastest-growing business area – recorded a 22% increase at constant exchange rates. A further point of comparison is the consensus target price compiled by Bloomberg, which stands at €60.10 per share, significantly higher than the €53 proposed in the offer. The fund’s position is clear: ‘Palliser does not support the offer and does not intend to tender its shares.’ Palliser’s position is summarised by James Smith, the fund’s chief investment officer, who takes issue with both the uncertainty surrounding the independent directors’ assessment and the scale of the counter-bid: ‘Shareholders are being asked to make a decision in the final days of the Offer without knowing where the independent directors stand: and this ambiguity benefits CVC alone.’ The manager therefore rejects the idea that the increase in the offer price could be considered sufficient to address the concerns raised by the fund: ‘A symbolic 3% increase does not make this offer fair, nor does it resolve the conflicts of interest and the coercive structure underlying it’. This refers to the conflicts of interest and the structure of the transaction, which Palliser regards as central to his opposition to the offer, in addition to the issue of whether the price is fair. According to Smith, the case could have implications that go beyond this individual case. “The outcome of this case involving one of the most important companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange will set a precedent for minority shareholders throughout Italia,” concludes the CIO. The request for clarification thus focuses on the role of independent directors and the transparency of the information available to shareholders during the final stage of the offer. For Palliser, the issue is not merely whether €53 represents an adequate price, but also whether investors can make their own decision whilst being explicitly aware of the valuation and any recommendation made by the independent directors.

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10/13/2026

BP’s New CEO to Outline Strategy as Balance Sheet Strengthens

Wall Street Journal (10/13/26) Whittaker, Adam

BP (NYSE: BP) expects its net debt to fall to between $13.5 billion and $14.5 billion by the end of the third quarter, down from $22.3 billion in the previous quarter, as higher oil and gas prices and cost-cutting efforts strengthen its balance sheet. The reduction puts BP ahead of its target of reaching $14 billion to $18 billion in net debt by the end of 2027 and excludes approximately $6 billion in expected proceeds from selling its Castrol lubricants business. Chief Executive Meg O’Neill, who took over in April, will outline her strategy for the energy company in December, emphasizing operational performance, disciplined investment, and portfolio simplification. O’Neill inherited a strategy that re-prioritized its traditional oil-and-gas business while paring back spending on renewable energy. Pressure on the company increased when in February last year Elliott Management took a stake in it. BP has placed its U.K. North Sea assets and U.S. biogas business up for sale while shifting investment toward higher-returning oil and gas projects following disappointing returns from its renewable energy expansion. The company also expects a $3 billion to $4.5 billion charge against its energy transition businesses, including electric-vehicle charging, bioenergy, and renewable assets. Meanwhile, stronger refining margins and oil trading performance have benefited BP as geopolitical conflicts, refinery attacks, and export restrictions tighten global diesel and jet fuel supplies. BP’s shares rose 1.3% following the update.

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